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Abstract
This bachelor’s thesis aims at research concerning a security of wireless networks. It delivers
a study of widely used network technologies and principles of wireless security. Analysed
technologies and security algorithms suffer weaknesses that can be exploited to perform the
MitM attack. The thesis includes an overview of available tools focused on exploiting these
individual weaknesses.
The outcome of the thesis is the wifimitm package and the wifimitmcli CLI tool, both
implemented in Python. The package provides a functionality for automated MitM attack
and can be used by other software. The wifimitmcli tool is capable of performing a successful
fully automated attack without any intervention from an attacking person. This research
can be used for automated penetration testing and for forensic investigation.
Abstrakt
Tato bakalářská práce se zaměřuje na výzkum v oblasti bezpečnosti bezdrátových sítí.
Práce přináší studii široce využívaných síťových technologií a principů zajištění bezpečnosti
bezdrátových sítí. Analyzované technologie a způsoby zabezpečení trpí slabinami, které
mohou být zneužity k provedení útoku MitM. Práce zahrnuje přehled dostupných nástrojů
zaměřených na využití jednotlivých slabin.
Výsledkem této práce je balíček wifimitm a CLI nástroj, oba implementované v jazyce
Python. Balíček poskytuje funkcionalitu pro automatizovaný útok MitM a může být použit
jako součást dalšího software. Nástroj wifimitmcli je schopen úspěšného provedení plně
automatizovaného útoku bez jakéhokoli zásahu útočící osoby. Tento výzkum nachází využití
v oblasti automatizovaných penetračních testů a forenzního vyšetřování.
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Rozšířený abstrakt
Tato bakalářská práce se zaměřuje na výzkum v oblasti bezpečnosti bezdrátových sítí. Cílem
výzkumu byl návrh, implementace a testování nástroje, který by byl schopen provedení plně
automatizovaného útoku Man-in-the-Middle na bezdrátových sítích bez jakéhokoli zásahu
útočící osoby. Úspěšné provedení útoku MitM umožňuje útočníkovi nejen odposlouchávat,
ale také upravovat probíhající komunikaci oběti. Práce přináší studii široce využívaných síťo-
vých technologií a principů zajištění bezpečnosti bezdrátových sítí. Analyzované technologie
a způsoby zabezpečení trpí slabinami, které mohou být zneužity k provedení útoku MitM.
Práce analyzuje metody a nástroje zaměřené na penetrační testování, možnosti zachy-
cení a podvržení síťové komunikace, prolamování hesel a hacking obecně. V současné době
jsou dostupné specializované nástroje zaměřené na jednotlivé slabiny bezpečnostních prin-
cipů aplikovaných v bezdrátových sítích. Obdobně jsou k dispozici nástroje zaměřené na
jednotlivé kroky nutné k úspěšnému provedení útoku MitM. V situaci, kdy je vybraná bez-
drátová síť dostatečně zabezpečena po technické stránce, je možné se zaměřit na samotné
uživatele sítě, kteří mohou být slabým článkem vedoucím k prolomení zabezpečení sítě.
Z tohodo důvodu práce dále analyzuje možnosti impersonifikace a phishingových útoků
za účelem získání neautorizovaného přístupu do sítě.
Strategie útoku byla vyvinuta s využitím získaných znalostí, citovaných výzkumů a prak-
tických zkušeností z provedených experimentů. Strategie je schopna volby jednotlivých
kroků, které využívají dostupné nástroje a vedou k úspěšnému útoku MitM.
Výsledkem této práce je balíček wifimitm a CLI nástroj, oba implementované v jazyce
Python. Balíček poskytuje funkcionalitu pro automatizovaný útok MitM a může být použit
jako součást dalšího software. Nástroj wifimitmcli, využívající funkcionalitu implmentova-
ného balíčku, zajišťuje jednotlivé kroky útoku. Výsledná distribuce software obsahuje řadu
náležitostí pro zajištění pohodlného použití, například instalační skripty, kontrolu poža-
davků na software, instalaci Python balíčku a nástroje wifimitmcli, soubor README.md
a manuálovou stránku.
Automatizovaný nástroj wifimitmcli, tedy i balíček wifimitm, byl testován v průběhu
experimentů s využitím dostupného vybavení. Na základě výsledků experimentů se ukázalo,
že implementovaný software je schopen úspěšného provedení plně automatizovaného útoku
bez jakéhokoli zásahu útočící osoby.
Software, který je výsledkem tohoto výzkumu, může být použit pro potřeby forenz-
ního vyšetřování. Nástroj schopný automatizovaných útoků MitM na bezdrátových sítích
může být dále využit ke zdokonalení zabezpečení sítí díky automatické detekci jejich slabin.
Z tohoto pohledu může být wifimitmcli považován za automatizovaný penetrační nástroj.
Automation of MitM Attack on WiFi Networks
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This bachelor’s thesis is focused on security of wireless networks. The aim of this research
is to design, implement and test a tool able to automate the whole process of Man-in-the-
Middle attack on Wireless Local Area Networks. This way, using the automated tool would
not require any action from the user of the tool.
The Man-in-the-Middle is definitely a very dangerous network attack. A successful
realization of this attack allows not only eavesdropping on all the victim’s network commu-
nication but also spoofing the communication.
Concerning the Wireless Local Area Networks, one of their main advantages is the
possibility of user’s convenient mobility within the range of the network. However, this
could be considered their weakness at the same time. Wireless networks transfer information
between communicating devices using a shared medium – electromagnetic signal. Based on
this concept, the network could be attacked by devices which are within the signal range.
The attacker therefore does not need a direct access to the network devices.
Because the MitM attack exploits weaknesses in currently used network technologies,
it is essential to focus on significant network technologies in chapter 2. Outlined tech-
nologies are widespread, but unfortunately, in current form, they do not provide sufficient
security solutions.
For the chosen implementation of the Man-in-the-Middle attack, it is important for
an attacker to be in the same WLAN as a victim. For this reason, chapter 3 of this research
focuses on principles of wireless networks, security possibilities and especially on exploitable
weaknesses of individual security algorithms.
Upon successful connection to the network, the attacker needs to adjust a network
topology. For this purpose, weaknesses of several network technologies can be exploited.
Possible ways of tampering the network topology are described together with available
countermeasures against specific attacks in chapter 4. From the point when the attacker
is connected to the network and topology is successfully modified, the attacker can start
capturing or modifying all the victim’s network traffic.
A detailed characteristic of the Man-in-the-Middle attack is in chapter 5. This chap-
ter further describes that even a secure communication using HTTPS can be successfully
attacked, captured and modified.
Finally, the software product based on the whole research is described in chapter 6.
Design and implementation work on this thesis resulted in a Python package and a CLI tool
providing functionality for the automated attacks. The implemented package was named
wifimitm and the CLI tool was named wifimitmcli. Emphasis was placed on possibilities of
further incorporation of the developed tool, convenient modification and distribution.
3
Chapter 2
Significant network technologies
This chapter provides a basic description of the network technologies which are currently
used in wireless networks and are important for the remainder of this thesis, namely,
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol in the section 2.1, Address Resolution Protocol
in the section 2.2 and Neighbor Discovery in the section 2.3.
Following technologies, which find a significant utilization, unfortunately suffer from
security weaknesses in their protocols. These security flaws can be used in the process of
Man-in-the-Middle attack. Individual attacks, exploiting the flaws of these protocols, with
possible countermeasures are outlined in sections 4.1 to 4.3.
2.1 DHCP
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol is used to provide the network device with a suitable
configuration without need for intervention from the user. Because of the use of DHCP in
WLAN networks, users can comfortably connect to network and in a very short time start
to communicate.
The functionality of DHCP is based on the client-server model. The DHCP server
manages the assignment of network configuration details to individual clients. Computers
connecting to the network take the role of clients. The client needs to run DHCP client soft-
ware for the purpose of DHCP communication. After successful connection to network, the
client inquires DHCP server for configuration details. For the correct network connectivity
of the client, the following configuration details are obtained from the DHCP server:
• client’s IP address from an appropriate range,
• subnet mask,
• IP address of the default gateway,
• IP address of DNS server for domain name resolution.
DHCP server’s reply can contain additional configuration details. Sequence of mes-
sages exchanged between DHCP client and servers is in appendix A (Droms 1997). More
information can be found in the literature (Droms 1997).
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2.2 ARP
ARP refers to the Address Resolution Protocol, which provides mapping of IP address
to the corresponding MAC address of the device in local area network based on IPv4.
In networks based on IPv6, mapping of IP and MAC addresses is provided by Neighbor
Discovery, which is described in section 2.3.
Communication in the context of ARP is composed of ARP Request and ARP Reply
messages. Devices on the LAN need to be aware of individual MAC addresses for connec-
tivity. In the case that some device needs to send data to a given IP address, the device
needs to obtain the corresponding destination’s MAC address. If the sender does not have
information about the mapping of IP and MAC addresses, it transmits an ARP Request
to the LAN. This message is sent to all devices on the local network, requesting the device
specified by IP address to reply with its MAC address. The appropriate device replies using
an ARP Reply message and announces the mapping of its IP and MAC address (Plummer
1982).
ARP Request broadcast on the local network can be used by other devices to record
IP and MAC address mappings. Network devices store information gathered from ARP
communication in an ARP table, also referred to as the ARP Cache. If the sender has
information concerning required mapping in its ARP table, the sender is able to immediately
send data to destination (Plummer 1982).
2.3 Neighbor Discovery
IPv6 utilizes features of Internet Control Message Protocol version 6 (ICMPv6) in order
to map devices in the local network with Neighbor Discovery (ND). To be able to commu-
nicate in IPv6 network, a device needs information about IP and MAC address mapping
in the same way as in IPv4.
IPv6 ND provides similar functionality as ARP in IPv4 networks. In terms of this work,
especially important is the Neighbor Solicitation (NS), and Router Advertisement (RA).
Messages of NS are transmitted in network when device is inquiring the MAC address
of a device specified by IPv6 address. After delivery of NS, the appropriate device announces
its MAC address with Neighbor Advertisement (NA). Messages of NS can be also used to
determine reachability of specified point in network. Messages of RA are periodically sent
by the router connected to a local network. These messages are used to continuously
announce the existence of router and other details (Cisco Systems, Inc. 2012, p. 81).
2.4 Summary
In the chapter Significant network technologies, three current network technologies relevant
for the MitM attack were introduced. DHCP provides automated assignment of network
configuration. ARP is used to obtain the mapping information about IP and MAC addresses
of the devices in IPv4 networks. Neighbor Discovery is used in IPv6 networks for similar
purpose as ARP.
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Chapter 3
Wireless Local Area Networks
In section 3.1 of this chapter, the functionality of Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) is
outlined as an introduction to the principles of wireless communication. Due to the fact that
the topic of this thesis is strongly related to the security of WLANs, principles of providing
security in WLANs are analyzed in sections 3.2 to 3.5. Considering following analysis of
security principles, it is important to define network security in the first place. Security of
network communication can be divided into following areas (Halsall 2005, p. 633):
Integrity
Securing that network communication was not spoofed.
Privacy
Ensuring that transferred information is not available to any unauthorized party.
Authentication
Communication is realized with authenticated party.
3.1 Concept of WLAN
The terms WLAN and Wi-Fi are currently used for wireless networks, where particular
devices communicate through electromagnetic signal and their communication meets the
standard IEEE 802.11 (Halsall 2005). However, the label Wi-Fi® was introduced for certifi-
cation of devices that are compatible for communication in wireless networks. The certified
devices can be marked Wi-Fi CERTIFIED™, which is a trademark of the Wi-Fi Alliance®,
originally Wireless Ethernet Compatibility Alliance (Wi-fi.org 2016).
Radio communication of electronic devices can be characterized by the frequency. A fre-
quency range is typically licensed, that is, permission is necessary for using a device com-
municating on the licensed frequency (CTU.cz 2016).
Wireless networks use a special unlicensed bandwidth for their radio communication.
There are special frequency ranges in which the devices can communicate when their owner
does not possess a special license for usage of the given frequency. These special intervals
comprise of frequencies around 2,4 GHz and 5 GHz. There are other specific requirements
for operation of radio devices on the unlicensed frequency, for example, a maximal output
power (CTU.cz 2016).
Due to the fact that there is a frequency range designated to WLAN networks, interfer-
ence can occur in areas with a high density of WLAN networks. However, it is not possible
to restrict operations in these networks because a non-restrictive attitude is essential for
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the unlicensed band (CTU.cz 2016). On the basis of IEEE 802.11 standard (IEEE-SA 2012)
a wireless network can operate in one of two modes:
• infrastructure
• ad-hoc
The infrastructure mode introduces one main radio device called the Access Point (AP).
The network then contains several devices communicating with the AP, called Stations
(STAs). In wireless networks connected to the Internet, the AP ensures a radio commu-
nication with devices in local area network as well as a communication with the Internet.
In these networks, the communication takes place only between an STA and the AP, never
between the STAs themselves (Halsall 2005). Wireless networks operating in ad-hoc mode
do not use an AP. Networks in ad-hoc mode include STAs which communicate with each
other directly.
3.2 WEP
Wired Equivalent Privacy is a wireless network security algorithm introduced in 1997
as a part of the IEEE 802.11 standard (Halsall 2005, p. 665), (IEEE-SA 2012, pp. 1167–
1169). At this point, WEP is deprecated and superseded by subsequent algorithms. WEP
suffers from weaknesses and, therefore, it has been broken (Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir
2001). There are already implemented tools to provide access to wireless networks secured
by WEP available (Tews, Weinmann, and Pyshkin 2007).
Based on the IEEE 802.11 standard (IEEE-SA 2012), STAs need to perform a success-
ful authentication and association to join the wireless network. Regarding WEP secured
WLAN, authentication can be either Open System Authentication (OSA) or Shared Key
Authentication (SKA) (IEEE-SA 2012, pp. 1170–1174). In the case of WEP OSA, any STA
is able to successfuly authenticate to the AP. Sequence of Open System Authentication is
in fig. 3.1. Detailed information concerning individual frames can be found in the literature
(Robyns 2014, pp. 4–10), (IEEE-SA 2012, pp. 404–437).
WEP SKA provides authentication and security of transferred communication using
a shared key. The AP and all STAs in the network use the same shared key for encryption
and decryption of communication. Sequence of WEP Shared Key Authentication is shown
in fig. 3.2. Authentication of a STA, which is interested in connecting to the network, is
done via three-way handshake with the following principle (Halsall 2005, p. 665):
1. STA requests a connection to the WEP SKA secured wireless network, sends message
to AP and identifies itself.
2. AP replies with a plaintext challenge text to STA.
3. STA encrypts received challenge text using shared key previously set for this network,
encrypted text is sent back to AP.
4. AP decrypts the encrypted challenge text received from STA, if decrypted text and
original challenge text are the same, STA possesses the correct key for network and
it is successfully authenticated and connected.
Confidentiality of transferred data is ensured by encryption using the Rivest Cipher 4
(RC4) stream cipher. RC4 uses concatenation of shared key and Initialization Vector (IV)
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STA
STA
AP
AP
Probe Request
Probe Response
Authentication
Authentication
Association Request
Association Response
Figure 3.1: Sequence of WEP Open System Authentication
for generation of a sequence of values – a stream. The generated stream is used for en-
cryption and decryption of transferred data. Encrypted data is sent over the network with
enclosed initialization vector used for its encryption. After delivery of encrypted data, IV
can be used together with the shared key to successfully decrypt the data. For more in-
formation concerning this topic see (Halsall 2005, pp. 665–667). The integrity of data is
provided by the Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC). Methods used for cracking access to
WEP secured networks are based on analysis of transferred data with corresponding IVs.
3.3 WPA
Wi-Fi Protected Access® was developed in 2003 by the Wi-Fi Alliance as a reaction to
increasing number of security flaws in WEP. Introduced WPA was a subset of IEEE 802.11i
standard (Liu, Jin, and Wang 2010, p. 1), (Jelínek 2010, p. 60), (Robyns 2014, p. 22).
Change from WEP to WPA security algorithm was possible for some client devices and
APs using a firmware update.
Main security improvement of WPA is the Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP).
The principle of TKIP is an algorithm where every packet uses its own generated secret
128-bit key. WPA also comes with advanced methods to provide data integrity. From the
security configuration point of view, WPA is differentiated between personal and enterprise
use. These two WPA forms are referred to as WPA Personal and WPA Enterprise. The
difference is distinguishable mainly in the ways of authentication, where personal mode
relies on a Pre-Shared Key (PSK) key and enterprise mode uses an authentication server.
Main flaws of WPA security algorithm can be identified in the case of using PSK for
generation of other keys. In the beginning of client device’s communication, unsecured
exchange of confidential information is performed during four-way handshake. An attacker
can obtain this unsecured communication and use it for consecutive cracking of the PSK.
Concerning the effort of gaining unauthorized access to the secured network, an attacker can
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AP
AP
Probe Request
Probe Response
Authentication
Authentication challenge text
Authenticationchallenge text,WEP encrypted
Compares decrypted
and original challenge text.
Authentication
Association Request
Association Response
Figure 3.2: Sequence of WEP Shared Key Authentication
focus on dictionary attacks. The speed of dictionary attacks can be increased for example
by precomputing the Pairwise Master Keys (PMKs). Precomputation of PMKs can be
performed offline and before the individual network attack. This approach can be described
as space-time tradeoff. With multithreaded systems and GPUs, precomputation of PMKs
is a significant improvement of this dictionary attack. More details about possibilities
of precomputation of PMKs can be found in the literature (Liu, Jin, and Wang 2010, p. 3).
A detailed description of WPA is available in the literature (Jelínek 2010).
3.4 WPA2
Security algorithm Wi-Fi Protected Access II is a successor of WPA. WPA2™ was intro-
duced in 2004 and provides higher level of security in comparison to previous security algo-
rithms. Security principles utilized in WPA2 are defined in an amendment to IEEE 802.11
standard named IEEE 802.11i (IEEE-SA 2004), (Jelínek 2010, p. 60), (Robyns 2014, p. 22).
Due to the higher complexity of securing mechanisms used in WPA2, this algorithm
was not suitable for some devices in the time of its introduction. Similarly as WPA,
WPA2 distinguishes between personal and enterprise modes. The main advantage of WPA2
is a utilization of Advanced Encryption Standard using symmetric block cipher.
Weaknesses of the Pre-Shared Key algorithm remain significant also for the WPA2.
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Information exposed during the four-way handskahe can be used for the dictionary attack,
which can also be improved by PMKs precomputation (Kumkar et al. 2012, pp. 37–38),
(Liu, Jin, and Wang 2010, p. 3).
3.5 WPS
A very important security flaw in wireless networks secured by WPA or WPA2 is function-
ality called Wi-Fi Protected Setup™. This technology was introduced in 2006 with aim to
provide an easy and secure way of connecting to the network.
For connection to the correctly secured network, it is possible to use a special Personal
Identification Number (PIN). The process of connecting to the properly secured network by
providing PIN is however very prone to brute-force attacks (Viehböck 2011a), (Viehböck
2011b), (Heffner 2011). Due to the fact that WPS is a common feature in today’s access
points and that WPS is usually turned on by default, WPS can be a very common security
flaw even in networks secured by WPA2 with a strong password. Currently, there are al-
ready available automated tools for exploiting WPS weaknesses, e.g., Reaver Open Source1.
3.6 Specific security flaws
Apart from the main and general security flaws applied to the majority of wireless net-
works, many networks are still vulnerable to basic security negligence. These flaws are
commonly caused by a user who is not aware of the security aspects and who has not set
up configuration correctly.
Newly purchased access points usually use WPA2 security by default. Currently, many
access points can be found using default passwords not only for wireless network access,
but even for AP web administration. There are already implemented tools, which exploit
relations between SSIDs and default network passwords, e.g., upc_keys2 by Peter Geissler.
These tools could be used in an attack on the network with default SSID to improve
dictionary attack using possible passwords.
3.7 Tools for accessing wireless networks
Security algorithms described in previous sections suffer from weaknesses which can be
exploited to access wireless networks. Already implemented tools focused on these vulner-
abilities are outlined in this section. Described Aircrack-ng suite focuses on cracking of
networks, while wifiphisher utilizes phishing attacks and social engineering.
Aircrack-ng suite
In order to access secured wireless networks, Aircrack-ng suite is considered a reliable
software solution. Aircrack-ng suite is a collection of individual tools, which are aimed at
assessing WLAN security.
The airodump-ng tool is capable of packet capture of raw wireless communication frames.
It is also able to provide a summary of detected APs and STAs in a format convenient for
1URL: https://code.google.com/archive/p/reaver-wps/
2URL: https://haxx.in/upc-wifi/
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further processing. Concerning attacks to the WEP secured networks, airodump-ng is able
to collect IVs.
Airmon-ng is a script focused on the process of managing monitor mode of a wireless
interface. It is also able to detect and stop running processes that could interfere with
the other tools from the Aircrack-ng suite.
Injection of specific wireless frames can be done using the aireplay-ng tool. Aireplay-ng
offers several injection attacks, e.g., Deauthentication, Fake authentication, ARP Request
replay attack, KoreK chopchop attack, Fragmentation attack and Cafe-latte attack. It can
be also used for injection test to determine, whether the attacker’s device is capable of
injecting packets and to analyze conectivity to the APs.
Another constituent part of the Aircrack-ng suite is a tool called aircrack-ng, which is
focused on WEP, WPA and WPA2 PSK key cracking. Aircrack-ng can crack WEP key
from a packet capture provided by airodump-ng. Cracking of WEP key depends on the
capture of IVs. Cracking of WPA and WPA2 PSK is done by a dictionary attack and
depends on the capture of four-way handshake.
Successful attacks on WEP and WPA/WPA2 utilizing Aircrack-ng suite can be found
for example in (Kumkar et al. 2012, pp. 34–38) and in (Jelínek 2010, pp. 73–86). More
information about the entire Aircrack-ng suite including tutorials for individual attacks can
be found on its website (d’Otreppe 2016).
wifiphisher
In the case that an attacked network is secured properly, other attacking methods can be
used in order to access the network. Even if the network uses WPA2 with a very strong
and regularly changed password, the weakest part of the security can be legitimate users of
the network. From this point of view, phishing attacks and social engineering attacks have
a significant role. Success of these attacks strongly depends on security awareness of users.
The wifiphisher tool focuses on automated phishing attacks by impersonating attacked
Access Point. Aim of this tool is to obtain a network password from users of the network.
Wifiphisher is able to continuously deauthenticate STAs from selected AP. At this point,
victims are not able to stay correctly connected to the genuine AP. At the same time,
wifiphisher creates an AP which impersonates the attacked one. Depending on the indi-
vidual setup of victim’s device and power of signal of attacker’s AP, victim’s STA could
even connect to the attacker’s AP automatically. When the victim is disconnected from the
genuine network, victim could try to select network manually and connect to the attacker’s
network. After the victim connects to the attacker’s network, the victim receives selected
phishing website.
Wifiphisher provides phishing website templates, e.g., browser connection reset requiring
network password. Wifiphisher is implemented in Python language and more information
about this tool can be found on its repository website3.
3.8 Summary
The chapter Wireless Local Area Networks introduced main aspects of WLANs. Wireless
networks can operate in an infrastructure mode with an AP and STAs, or in an ad-hoc
mode consisting only of STAs.
3URL: https://github.com/sophron/wifiphisher
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As described in section 3.2, WEP is a security algorithm which has severe security flaws.
Concerning current state of technology, WLAN utilizing WEP should not be considered
a sufficiently secured network. In the case of using a WEP secured network, users need to
be aware of the fact that their communication can be easily eavesdropped and spoofed.
WPA and WPA2 provide significantly better level of network security. However, an at-
tacker can easily obtain a four-way handshake, which is required for an offline dictionary
attack. If the network uses WPA/WPA2 PSK, it is important to remember that the network
is only as secure as strong is its key.
Considering the WPS, there are not many cases when its benefits would compensate
the possible risks. Even if the network uses a very strong PSK, enabled WPS could be
the weakest part of the chain, letting attackers in the network.
In section 3.7, the Aircrack-ng suite was introduced together with its important tools,
e.g., airodump-ng, airmon-ng, aireplay-ng and aircrack-ng. This collection of tools can be
effectively used by an attacker not only for a manual attack, but also as a part of other
advanced tools. The wifiphisher tool can be used for a phishing attack to obtain the
network password.
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Chapter 4
Tampering network topology
The following text is focused on analysis of current state and possibilities of intentional
unauthorized modification of network topology. Tampering could be performed at the
moment when an attacker is successfully connected to the targeted wireless network.
4.1 DHCP Spoofing
DHCP Spoofing generates fake communication which is used for providing dynamic net-
work configuration for devices in current network. Principles of DHCP are described in sec-
tion 2.1. This attack can also be reffered to as Rogue DHCP (Duangphasuk, Kungpisdan,
and Hankla 2011, p. 288).
An attacker can perform this kind of attack in order to provide devices in the network
with special and intentional configuration, most often a fake default gateway address or DNS
address. If the attacker manages to change the victim’s default gateway to the attacker’s
address, the victim will route all its traffic through the attacker’s device. At this point, the
attacker is in a network topology suitable for the Man-in-the-Middle attack. If the attacker
manages to impersonate the victim’s DNS, he is then able to take control of all victim’s
domain name resolutions (Callegati, Cerroni, and Ramilli 2009, p. 79).
During this attack, the attacker runs his own DHCP server. At this point, the local
network contains two DHCP servers, which are willing to offer configuration. Schema of
this network attack can be seen in fig. 4.1. Sequence of this attack is shown in fig. 4.2.
DHCP Spoofing progresses based on the following principle:
1. An attacker listens for DHCP communication and awaits a request for assigning
the configuration.
2. DHCP client at client’s device sends a request for configuration details to the local
network. In fig. 4.2, the Client broadcasts DHCP Discover message.
3. Attacker’s fake DHCP server creates a message and tries to reply to the client faster
than the genuine DHCP server. This attack assumes that the attacker’s DHCP server
is able to reply faster than the real DHCP server. Speed difference can be improved
by making the real DHCP server busy and overloaded.
4. In the case of successful attack, the client receives spoofed network configuration.
Client accepts this configuration and the address of default gateway and optionally
address of DNS is changed.
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Client
Spoofer
Server
1. DHCP Discover
2. Spoofed DHCP Offer
3. DHCP Offer
Figure 4.1: Schema of DHCP Spoofing
Spoofer Client Server
DHCP DiscoverDHCP Discover
DHCP Offer
DHCP Offer
Selects configuration
DHCP Request
DHCP Ack
Figure 4.2: Sequence of DHCP Spoofing (rest of the communication is omitted)
DHCP Snooping
A possible countermeasure against DHCP Spoofing attack is a method called DHCP Snoop-
ing. By applying this method, network devices are configured in a way, that they are able
to detect spoofed DHCP message.
Important network devices accept DHCP messages coming from connections linked to
the genuine DHCP server. DHCP messages coming from connections which are not linked
to the genuine DHCP server are declined. This means that individual network connections
on individual devices are divided into groups and marked as trusted or untrusted (Cisco
Systems, Inc. 2016, pp. 54-2). If the network contains an unknown DHCP server on an
untrusted connection, the server is reffered to as spurious DHCP server. The detection
of spoofed DHCP messages can result in, for example, disconnection of the attacker and
notifying the network administrator. Schema of defense referred to as DHCP snooping is
shown in fig. 4.3. In fig. 4.4, the Client and the DHCP Spoofer are considered as untrusted
and the Server is trusted. The AP, in the role of DHCP Snooper, is able to detect all
DHCP Offers it routes.
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Figure 4.3: Schema of DHCP Snooping
Untrusted Trusted
Spoofer Client Snooper (AP) Server
DHCP Discover
DHCP DiscoverDHCP Discover
DHCP Offer
DHCP Spoofing
detected.
DHCP Offer
DHCP Offer
Figure 4.4: Sequence of DHCP Snooping (rest of the communication is omitted)
4.2 ARP Spoofing
A network attack called ARP Spoofing focuses on providing the network devices with fake
ARP messages. Description of ARP can be found in section 2.2.
Considering this attack, attacker’s possibilities are in persuading the victim that the
attacker’s MAC address is correctly mapped to some specific IP address. If the attacker’s
aim is to be in the Man-in-the-Middle position, he is able to persuade the victim about
the mapping of default gateway’s IP address to the attacker’s MAC address. IP address of
default gateway in the currently attacked network can be easily obtained for example from
transferred DHCP messages (Cisco Systems, Inc. 2016, pp. 56-2).
An attacker can also try to get into the position of Man-in-the-Middle between two
devices communicating in the local network. In this case, the attacker would try to persuade
each communicating side about the mapping of respective IP addresses to the attacker’s
MAC address (Cisco Systems, Inc. 2016, pp. 56-2). More information about ARP Spoofing
can be found in the literature (Whalen 2001), (Wagner 2001).
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Dynamic ARP Inspection
Possible defense against ARP Spoofing attack is analysis of ARP messages transmitted in
the network. This method is called Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI).
As a result of ARP message analysis, given message can be accepted or declined. Net-
work device performing DAI can be configured to distinguish its connections as trusted
or untrusted. ARP messages in trusted connections are not analyzed. Analysing device
possesses a trusted database of mapping of IP and MAC addresses in the corresponding
local network. When the analyzing device receives an ARP message from the untrusted
connection, analyzing device can verify the content of ARP message against a trusted map-
ping database. When a spoofed ARP message with incorrect mapping is detected, ARP
message is declined and the incident can be reported to the network administrator (Cisco
Systems, Inc. 2016, pp. 56-2).
4.3 IPv6 Neighbor Spoofing
Networks based on IPv6 addressing do not use ARP for IP and MAC address mapping.
IPv6 networks use Neighbor Discovery for the similar purpose. Unfortunately, the absence
of ARP in IPv6 does not guarantee immunity to the attacks based on a very similar principle
as ARP Spoofing.
Neighbor Discovery concerning IPv6 networks is described in section 2.3. In a similar
way to ARP Spoofing, attacker can send a specially generated Neighbor Advertisement
message to the victim. The main aim of the attacker is, in this case, the same as in the
previous attack. The attacker wants to be in the position suitable for the Man-in-the-Middle
attack (Stretch 2009). A schema of this attack can be seen in fig. 4.5.
Client
Spoofer
1. Neighbor Solicitation
3. Neighbor Advertisement
2. Spoofed Advertisement
Figure 4.5: Schema of IPv6 Neighbor Spoofing
Neighbor Discovery Inspection
Due to the very similar characteristic of IPv6 Neighbor Spoofing and ARP Spoofing at-
tacks, possible countermeasures are similar as well. Possible defense is Neighbor Discovery
Inspection (NDI).
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A network device which is performing NDI possesses a trusted database of IP and MAC
address mappings. This device verifies information transferred in ND messages against its
database. If the device finds an ND message incorrect and spoofed, the message is declined
and the incident should be reported (Juniper Networks, Inc. 2014).
4.4 Tools for tampering network topology
In order to change the network topology, the attacker can perform attacks described in
previous sections of this chapter. There are already implemented tools and software li-
braries, which provide functionality for these attacks. Some of these tools are even capable
of automated attacks. Available tools are outlined in the following text.
Scapy
Scapy is a program capable of interactive packet manipulation. It is written in the Python
language by Philippe Biondi1. Scapy can be used for capturing, forging and sending pack-
ets (Secdev.org 2010).
Main advantage of Scapy is the possibility of incorporating its functionality into an
automated script, because it is available not only as an interactive program, but also as
a Python package. Scapy as a Python package is also extensible using add-ons. More
information about tool Scapy can be found in its documentation (Secdev.org 2010).
dsniff
Collection of network auditing and penetration testing tools called dsniff contains several
advanced programs, which could be used for tampering network topology. This collection
was developed by Dug Song2. In the following sections, selected tools from dsniff collec-
tion are introduced. Detailed information concerning dsniff collection is available on its
website (Song 2001).
arpspoof
For the realization of ARP Spoofing attack, which is described in section 4.2, it is possible to
use the functionality of a tool called arpspoof. This software is focused on sending spoofed
ARP messages into selected local network. Tool arpspoof is a constituent part of dnsiff
collection (Song 2001).
Yersinia
The Yersinia framework is focused on several weaknesses of network protocols. It can
be used to perform a DHCP Spoofing attack, which is described in section 4.1. Yersinia
offers implementation of DHCP server, which is focused on this attack (Andrés and Barroso
2005a, p. 21). More information about the Yersinia framework can be retrieved from its
website (Andrés and Barroso 2005b).
1URL: http://www.secdev.org/projects/scapy/doc/backmatter.html
2URL: https://www.monkey.org/∼dugsong/
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MITMf
Framework for Man-In-The-Middle attacks (MITMf) offers a wide range of incorporated
tools aimed at MitM attack. For the purpose of this thesis, MITMf is especially important
for included HTTP and DNS servers. It also offers various plugins which can be used
during the attack. An available plugin called Spoof provides functionality to perform several
attacks aimed at traffic redirection such as ARP Spoofing and DHCP Spoofing, which are
described in sections 4.1 and 4.2. MITMf is written in the Python language and more
details about this framework can be found on its repository website (byt3bl33d3r 2014).
4.5 Summary
The chapter Tampering network topology was focused on providing an overview of relevant
network attacks, which could be used to establish a network topology suitable for the Man-
in-the-Middle attack.
DHCP Spoofing can be used to change the victim’s default gateway or DNS. Success
of DHCP Spoofing depends on fast delivery of a spoofed DHCP Offer. Possible impact of
DHCP Spoofing can be eliminated by DHCP Snooping.
An attack called ARP Spoofing offers a way to impersonate targeted device in the local
network. An impersonated MAC address can belong to default gateway, in which case the
attacker would redirect all network traffic. ARP Spoofing can be detected by Dynamic
ARP Inspection.
In IPv6 networks, IPv6 Neighbor Spoofing can be used for the similar purpose as ARP
Spoofing. It could be detected and stopped by Neighbor Discovery Inspection. Section 4.4
serves as an overview of currently available tools, which can be used for realization of the
attacks described in sections 4.1 to 4.3.
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Chapter 5
Man-in-the-Middle attack
In the following part of this work, the principle of a Man-in-the-Middle attack is described.
Concerning the network attack, important prerequisites for its realization and possibilities
of exploitation are outlined as well.
Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) refers to the situation, where the attacker’s device is located
in the network topology between two participants of the communication. The attacker then
acts as an intermediary and the network traffic is routed through the attacking device.
This state of unauthorized intentionally changed network topology enables the attacker to
eavesdrop on passed communication. The attacker is also able to focus on decryption of
secured data transfer and on changing the content of passed communication. That means
that the attacker can inject special and harmful content. The attacker’s prioritized intention
is not only to take control over the traffic but also to perform this attack without anyone
noticing it.
In the wireless network topology suitable for realization of this attack, the attacker’s
device acts towards the victim as its default gateway. All the communication routed out-
side the local network from the victim is sent to the default gateway, in this case to the
attacker’s device. From the attacker’s device, the communication can be further routed to
the real default gateway (Callegati, Cerroni, and Ramilli 2009). For the successful execu-
tion of this attack, the attacker needs to be connected to the targeted network. Possibilities
of connecting to the secured wireless networks are described in sections 3.2 to 3.7. In order
to tamper the network topology, an attacker can perform the attacks outlined in chapter 4
using the tools listed in the section 4.4.
5.1 MitM attack to the HTTPS
HTTPS uses asymmetric cryptography with private and public keys to provide secure
HTTP communication. If the victim is communicating using HTTPS, successful realization
of MitM attack is more difficult.
During communication of web browser on client’s device with a web server, these two
parties exchange a certificate containing a public key for providing a secure data transfer.
MitM attack, in this case, captures transferred certificate and replaces it with a forged
one (Callegati, Cerroni, and Ramilli 2009). The forged certificate is at this point a self-
signed certificate. Upon reception of the self-signed certificate, victim’s web browser can
show some warning concerning possible risk. If the victim is not aware of the possible
consequences, the victim can accept the certificate. In the case of success, both communi-
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cating devices are convinced of secured HTTPS communication, but the attacking device
has the ongoing communication available.
5.2 DNS Spoofing
Network attack DNS Spoofing focuses on possibilities of spoofing DNS communication
used for resolution of domain names and IP addresses. For the successful realization of this
attack, the attacker needs to be able to detect and intercept DNS messages in the network.
The aim of this attack is to direct the victim to different device by providing fake
mapping of inquired domain name to a special IP address. The attacker is able to imitate
the inquired service by running a similar rogue service on the provided spoofed IP address.
If the victim is convinced that the inquired service is genuine, the attacker can then focus on
capturing confidential information and credentials. The attacker can also use DNS Spoofing
for providing the real service, but with enclosed harmful content. DNS Spoofing can be
effectively applied for spoofing fake websites (Prowell, Kraus, and Borkin 2010, p. 112).
If the attacker detects a DNS message, he intercepts it and forges a reply for the victim.
The victim receives forged mapping of domain name to IP address and starts communication
with the fake device without noticing the attack. The attacker then acts as the inquired
service and therefore performs a Man-in-the-Middle attack.
dnsspoof
For the realization of DNS Spoofing, it is possible to use tool dnsspoof, which is a part of
dsniff collection. Collection dsniff was introduced in section 4.4 and more information can
be found on the respective website (Song 2001).
5.3 Summary
In chapter 5, the Man-in-the-Middle attack was introduced. MitM attack is a dangerous
network attack, which grants the attacker ability to eavesdrop and even spoof the victim’s
communication without victim’s knowledge.
Section 5.1 describes the experiments proving that HTTPS communication can be
harmed as well. Further described DNS Spoofing in combination with MitM attack can
be used for phishing for victim’s credentials by impersonation of requested websites and
other services.
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Chapter 6
Automation of MitM attack
This chapter focuses on the development of the software tool capable of automation of
Man-in-the-Middle attack. Different kinds of security approaches used in wireless networks
were outlined in chapter Wireless Local Area Networks together with known vulnerabilities.
Chapter Significant network technologies introduced currently used technologies. The ways
how security flaws in these technologies can be exploited to establish the MitM topology
were explained in chapter Tampering network topology. Principle of MitM attack and its
severity were outlined in chapter Man-in-the-Middle attack.
Finally, this chapter utilizes previously provided network security knowledge. The im-
plemented software stands on this knowledge and provides automation of the whole process
without need for intervention from the user.
Functionality for automated Man-in-the-Middle attack on Wi-Fi networks is provided
by implemented Python package named wifimitm. The name of the package is derived from
Wi-Fi Machine-in-the-Middle. Abilities of the wifimitm package are utilized in implemented
CLI named wifimitmcli.
6.1 Design
After studies and research of the appropriate fields from the network security, the research
was focused on the available tools for the individual phases of the automated MitM attack.
These tools were outlined in sections 3.7 and 4.4 based on their main purpose.
From perspective of the intended functionality of the implemented tool, whole process
of MitM attack on wireless networks can be divided into three main phases: Accessing
wireless network, Tampering network topology and Capturing traffic. State diagram of the
designed phases is in appendix B.
First phase named Accessing wireless network consists of several states. At first, the
tool needs to scan the wireless networks and find the one selected for attack. If the network
is not secured at all, the tool can connect immediately. If the network uses some security
algorithm, the tool needs to be able to crack the network password. In the case that the
network is secured properly, the tool should try to perform a phishing attack by impersonat-
ing the genuine network AP. Aim of this phishing attack is to obtain the network password
from its users. Following the successful cracking or phishing, the tool needs to connect to
the network. At the point, when the tool is successfully connected to the attacked network,
phase Accessing wireless network ends.
Considering the phase Accessing wireless network, the tools described in section 3.7 can
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be utilized. Airmon-ng can manage modes of a wireless interface. Airodump-ng can be used
to scan and detect attacked AP. Aircrack-ng together with aireplay-ng and airodump-ng
can be used for cracking WEP OSA, WEP SKA, WPA PSK and WPA2 PSK. The tool
wifiphisher can be used to perform impersonation and phishing. Connection to the wireless
network can be established by netctl1, which is a CLI tool focused on configuration and
management of network connections using profiles.
Phases Tampering network topology and Capturing traffic are concurrent, as shown in
the appendix B. These two phases form a MitM attack. MitM attack could possibly consist
of spoofing victim’s communication, as described in chapter 5. During Tampering network
topology, the tool needs to be able to change network topology into the one suitable for
MitM attack. The tool also needs to continuously work on keeping the network STAs
persuaded that the spoofed topology is the correct one. During the phase Capturing traffic,
the tool needs to be able to save network traffic into a capture file.
The tools from section 4.4 can be used during the Tampering network topology phase.
Framework for Man-In-The-Middle attacks with its Spoof plugin can be used to change the
network topology. Capturing traffic can be done by the tool dumpcap2, which is part of the
Wireshark3 distribution.
During this part of the work on the automated tool, the available tools were examined.
Several experiments concerning wireless network security and tampering network topology
were carried out. Behaviour, usage and success rate of individual tools as well as possibilities
of controlling them by the implemented tool were analyzed. The tools selected for individual
tasks of the automated MitM attack were chosen based on performed manual experiments.
6.2 Implementation
After completion of design of main characteristic and selection of tools for utilization by
the automated tool, implementation part of the work on the tool began. The implemented
tool is intended to run on Arch Linux4. This distribution was selected, because its very
lightweight and flexible. The user has possibilities of better control over the behaviour of
the operating system. This distribution was used for main development and testing as well.
According to the thesis assignment, Python 3.5 was selected as main implementation
language for the automated tool. Bash was selected as implementation language for sup-
porting tasks, e.g., installation of requirements and software wrappers.
Package structure
After finishing the development version release-0.1, which represented the first prototype of
the automated tool, more attention was paid to improving the architecture of the automated
tool. In the field of software development, very important aspects of the final software
product are, among other things, its re-usability, possibility and ease of modification and
ways of incorporating its functionality to other software products which would build on top
of it. This is especially important in the area of automated tools.
Architecture of the tool was therefore changed and improved. Main functionality of
the individual tasks concerning the MitM atack on Wi-Fi networks was separated from the
1URL: https://www.archlinux.org/packages/core/any/netctl/
2URL: https://www.wireshark.org/docs/man-pages/dumpcap.html
3URL: https://www.wireshark.org/
4URL: https://www.archlinux.org/
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user interface. This way, a Python package providing attack functionality was developed.
User interface for the implemented tool was developed as a script, which serves as an entry
point for the package. Using this approach, it is possible to develop more than one user
interface, e.g., Command Line Interface, Text User Interface, Graphical User Interface.
These individual interfaces could be separated from each other and even their dependencies
for required technologies could be separated.
Functionality implemented in the wifimitm package could be directly incorporated to
other software products based on Python language. This way the package would work as
a software library. An attack strategy could be modified as well by changing the way of
interaction with the package’s content. Structure of the implemented automated tool is
in appendix C.
Another advantage of implementing the functionality as a Python package comes in the
moment of software distribution. With the use of Python’s setuptools, a package can declare
its metadata, requirements, resources, entry points and other characteristics. A package
coupled with a file setup.py can be then easily distributed and installed including its re-
quirements. This approach also allows convenient usage of additional resources, which are
distributed with a package. Tools incorporating a package can then declare the package as
a dependency.
The wifimitm package consists of following modules: access, capture, common, imper-
sonation, model, requirements, topology, updatableProcess, wep, wpa2. The package further
contains folder for its resources and subpackage tests containing implemented unit tests.
Package’s modules contain their individual logger objects used for logging executed steps
at various logging levels.
Due to the fact, that the wifimitm needs to interact with other software tools, it re-
quires these software tools for its successful execution. Nature of the intended operations
during the individual steps of the attack also requires the tool to be executed with the
root privileges. The requirements module focuses on managing execution requirements and
their check during start of the tool. This module declares abstract base class for a generic
requirement and two more specific classes, one for executable software tool requirement and
the other for UID requirement. Instances of individual requirements are stored and can be
easily checked.
The access module focuses on accessing wireless network. It uses modules wep and wpa2,
which implement attacks and cracking based on the used security algorithm. The access
module offers an automated process of cracking selected wireless network. The wep module
is capable of fake authentication with the AP, ARP replay attack (to speed up gathering
of IVs) and cracking the key based on IVs. In the case of WPA2 secured network, the
wpa2 module is able to perform a dictionary attack, personalize used dictionary and verify
a password obtained by phishing. Verification of the password and dictionary attacks are
done with previously captured handshake. The common module contains functionality
which could be used in various parts of the process for scanning and capturing wireless
communication in monitor mode. The common module also offers a way to deauthenticate
STAs from selected AP.
If a dictionary attack against a correctly secured network fails, the impersonation mod-
ule is able to manage a phishing attack by impersonation. The topology module can be
used to change network topology. It provides functionality for ARP Spoofing. The capture
module focuses on capturing network traffic. It is intended to be used after the tool is suc-
cessfully connected to the attacked network and network topology was successfully changed
into the one suitable for MitM attack.
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Above described modules of the wifimitm package need to interact with STAs, APs
and wireless network interfaces. The model module supports the rest of the package with
implemented classes representing the network and interfaces for better interaction. This
module also provides functionality to save useful files that were obtained during attacks.
More information about saved files is in section Attack data.
Incorporation of tools
As noted previously, the implemented tool needs to be able to interact with many other
software tools in order to automate the attack process. Incorporated tools communicate
using Standard output stream (stdout), Standard error stream (stderr) and optionally using
generated files. Wifimitm needs to continuously analyze all these outputs to be aware
of current state of the incorporated tool. Information contained in the output can be
a summary of current progress, a notification that some event occurred or a result of an
intended action.
To meet requirements for efficient incorporation of other tools so that the wifimitm
package could interact with them, the updatableProcess module was developed. This mod-
ule contains an abstract base class UpdatableProcess, which inherits from Popen5 class
implemented in the subprocess module of The Python Standard Library. Individual incor-
porated tools have dedicated classes inherited from the UpdatableProcess which are used
for managing these tools from wifimitm.
When a process is spawned, using an instance of class inherited from UpdatableProcess,
it is assigned a temporary directory for its outputs. The running process is continuously
writing to stdout and stderr. The outputs are periodically analyzed.
UpdatableProcess offers a functionality to be used as a context manager. Upon entering
the context, a process is spawned. On exit from the context, the process is waited for and
a cleanup is done. A running process can be stopped and cleaned using available methods of
a corresponding class. Cleanup of the process’ outputs including opened files and created
directories can be done using the cleanup method. In order to automatically perform
a cleanup, UpdatableProcess uses a destructor method and a finalizer object, implemented
in the weakref 6 module of The Python Standard Library.
Classes inherited from UpdatableProcess can implement a signalization of process’ state,
concerning process’ purpose, using a Finite State Machine (FSM). Process’ output can in-
clude notifications of events. Upon detection of such event, flags can be set. Some processes
also output summary information, which can be used to update statistics. Continuously
updated information about the process can therefore consist of state, flags and statistics.
Abstract base class UpdatableProcess contains an abstract method update, which is in-
tended to implement a logic of an analysis of the process’ outputs. The analysis can result
in modification of process’ state, flags and statistics.
Attack data
Various attacks executed against the selected AP require some information to be captured
first. ARP request replay attack on WEP secured networks requires an ARP request to
be captured in order to start an attacking procedure. Fake authentication in WEP SKA
secured network requires PRGA XOR obtained from a detected authentication. Dictionary
5URL: https://docs.python.org/3/library/subprocess.html#subprocess.Popen
6URL: https://docs.python.org/3/library/weakref.html#weakref.finalize
24
attack against WPA PSK and WPA2 PSK secured networks requires a captured handshake.
Finally, for successful connection to a network, a correct key is required.
When the required information is obtained, it can be saved for a later usage to speed up
following or repetitive attacks. These data are implicitly stored as files inside user’s home
directory in .wifimitm/ directory. Data from successful attacks could be even shared
between users of the implemented tool. In possible future development of the tool, the data
could be stored in a shared database and accessed by users.
Personalized dictionaries
As described in section 3.6, weaknesses in default network passwords could be exploited to
improve dictionary attacks against WPA PSK and WPA2 PSK security algorithms.
The implemented tool incorporates upc_keys7 for generation of possible default pass-
words if the selected network matches the criteria. The upc_keys tool generates passwords,
which are transferred to the cracking tool using pipes. With this approach, the implemented
tool could be further improved for example to support localized dictionaries.
6.3 Installation
Based on the previously described facts, the implemented automated tool depends on sev-
eral other tools, which are being controlled. Wifimitm has to be able to start the required
tools, therefore they have to be available on a user’s system. The wifimitm package it-
self can be automatically installed by the package’s setup.py. After the installation, the
implemented automated tool can be started using its CLI named wifimitmcli. The rest
of software dependencies can be satisfied by installation of required tools. For convenient
setup of the implemented tool, aMakefile and several installation scripts and wrappers have
been developed.
MITMf has a number of dependencies, therefore it is highly recommended to use MITMf
inside a virtual environment as stated in its installation guide8. MITMf could be installed
using the package9 available on Arch User Repository (AUR), but unfortunately this pack-
age does not utilize the virtual environment. An installation scriptMITMf_install.sh is able
to install MITMf, including its dependencies. This script also creates a virtual environment
dedicated to MITMf. An implemented wrapper script is used to automate activation and
deactivation of the virtual environment before and after running MITMf. After installation,
MITMf can be easily run encapsulated in its virtual environment.
Wifiphisher is available in form of an AUR package10, but this package is not suitable
for correct installation, because currently (May 2016), it is not updated to the changes in
the repository structure of wifiphisher. An implemented installation script wifiphisher_in-
stall.sh is able to create a dedicated virtual environment and install wifiphisher. Convenient
usage of wifiphisher installed inside its virtual environment is achieved by a wrapper similar
to the one for MITMf. Due to the fact that some changes in wifiphisher ’s source code were
implemented, the installation script also applies a software patch to the installed wifiphisher.
Tool upc_keys is implemented in the C language and therefore it is compiled during
installation. Compiled upc_keys and the executable wrappers for MITMf and wifiphisher,
7URL: https://haxx.in/upc-wifi/
8URL: https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/MITMf/wiki/Installation
9URL: https://aur.archlinux.org/packages/mitmf-git/
10URL: https://aur.archlinux.org/packages/wifiphisher/
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which are described above, are linked from the /usr/bin/ directory after the installation.
The required tools are installed by their installation scripts to the /opt/ directory. In-
stallation of all the requirements can be started by requirements_install.sh script or Make-
file. A usage of implemented Makefile, which can be used for a convenient installation, is
shown in table 6.1.
Table 6.1: A usage of Makefile
Command Description
make requirements Install requirements.
make install Install the wifimitm package and the wifimitmcli tool.
make man Install a manual page of wifimitmcli.
make, make all Install requirements, the package, the tool and the manual page.
Hardware requirements
Due to the nature of specific steps of the attack, a special hardware equipment is required.
During the scanning and capturing of network traffic without being connected to the net-
work, an attacking device needs a wireless network interface in monitor mode. For sending
special forged packets, the wireless network interface also needs to be capable of packet
injection. In order to be able to perform a phishing attack, a second wireless interface
capable of master (AP) mode has to be available.
The user can check whether his hardware is capable of packet injection using the
aireplay-ng tool executed as aireplay-ng --test <replay interface> . Managing mon-
itor mode of interface is possible with the airmon-ng tool.
6.4 Usage
As described in section 6.3, after the installation the CLI can be started via wifimitm-
cli. During wifimitmcli’s run, usual output information is written to stdout, notifications
concerning errors are written to stderr. Wifimitmcli saves and loads attack data from
the ∼/.wifimitm/ directory.
According to the fact that wifimitmcli is an automated tool, it does not expect any
input from a user during its progress. The user can control behaviour of wifimitmcli by
program arguments provided at start of wifimitmcli.
This way, wifimitmcli does not even have to be started manually by user, but it could
be a part of other scripts. Table 6.2 shows an overview of program arguments of wifimitmcli
tool. The synopsis of wifimitmcli’s arguments is specified as follows: wifimitmcli [-h]
[-v] [-ll <level> ] [-p] [-cf FILE ] <ssid> <interface> .
As seen from the synopsis shown above, <ssid> and <interface> arguments are
mandatory to start wifimitmcli. In the case that provided arguments are not correct, an ap-
propriate error message and the synopsis is shown and the program terminates immediately
after the arguments check. For more information concerning usage of wifimitmcli, a user
can start the tool with -h or --help argument, which results in showing a help page. More
detailed information about wifimitmcli can be found on its installed manual page. Further
information can also be found in README.md, a file distributed with the source code.
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Table 6.2: Program arguments of wifimitmcli
Argument Description
-h, --help Show help message and exit.
-v, --version Show program’s version number and exit.
-ll <level> ,
--logging-level <level>
Select logging level (choices: disabled,
critical, error, warning, info, debug).
-p, --phishing Enable phishing attack if dictionary attack fails.
-cf FILE ,
--capture-file FILE Capture network traffic to provided file.
<ssid> Attack network with provided SSID.
<interface> Use provided wireless network interface for attack.
The implemented Python package wifimitm provides a functionality to log performed
actions using Python’s logging11 module. Individual modules contained in the wifimitm
package posses their own logger objects. The implemented wifimitmcli tool uses its logger
as well. This approach makes it possible for wifimitmcli to control all noted loggers. Level
of logging for the loggers can be set at start of wifimitmcli as a program argument.
Upon termination of the wifimitmcli tool, appropriate exit code indicating the result is
returned. Some of the implemented exit codes are inspired by sysexits12. Exit codes of the
implemented automated tool are shown in table 6.3
Table 6.3: Exit codes of wifimitmcli
Value Name Description
0 EX_OK Program terminated successfully.
2 ARGUMENTS Incorrect or missing arguments provided.
69 EX_UNAVAILABLE Required program or file does not exist.
77 EX_NOPERM Permission denied.
79 TARGET_AP_NOT_FOUND Target AP was not found during scan.
80 NOT_IN_ANY_DICTIONARY WPA/WPA2 passphrase was notfound in any available dictionary.
81 PHISHING_INCORRECT_PSK WPA/WPA2 passphrase obtainedfrom phishing attack is incorrect.
82 SUBPROCESS_ERROR Failure in subprocess occured.
130 KEYBOARD_INTERRUPT Program received SIGINT.
6.5 Testing
During development, a functionality of the wifimitmcli tool and the wifimitm package was
periodically tested. After the implementation part of the work on this thesis was finished,
several experiments were carried out in order to test the final implemented software product.
The author was working on this research during his studies at Faculty of Information
and Communication Technology, University of Malta, in 2016. Unfortunately, no wireless
network laboratory was available for experiments during the author’s stay at University
11URL: https://docs.python.org/3/library/logging.html
12URL: http://linux.die.net/include/sysexits.h
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of Malta. Due to this fact, the testing experiments were done with a limited range of
equipment that was available. A more complex testing is going to be performed at Faculty
of Information Technology, Brno University of Technology.
Before the individual experiments, a testing network infrastructure was set up. The
network consisted of one STA and one AP connected to the Internet. A scheme of the net-
work used for the experiments is shown in appendix D. The STA was correctly connected
with the AP and it was successfully communicating with the Internet. The implemented
wifimitmcli tool was then started with appropriate program arguments to automatically at-
tack the network. The test was considered successful, if the wifimitmcli was able to capture
network traffic according to the concept of MitM. For the test to be correct, no intervention
(help) from the attacker was allowed during the attack performed by wifimitmcli. Summary
of experiments is shown in appendix E.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
The main goal of this thesis was to implement a tool that would be able to automate
all the necessary steps to perform the Man-in-the-Middle attack on Wireless Local Area
Networks. The author searched for and analyzed a range of tools and methods focused on
penetration testing, communication sniffing and spoofing, password cracking and hacking
in general. In order to be able to design, implement and test the tool capable of such
attack, knowledge of different widespread security approaches was essential. Specialized
tools focused on exploiting individual weaknesses in security algorithms currently used in
WLANs are already available. There are also specialized tools focused on individual steps of
the MitM attack. The author further focused on possibilities of the MitM attack even in the
case that given WLAN is secured properly. Therefore, methods and tools for impersonation
and phishing were researched and analysed.
Based on the acquired knowledge, referenced researches and practical experience from
manual experiments, the author was able to create an attack strategy. The strategy was
composed of appropriate set of available tools. The strategy is then able to select individual
steps which are the most suitable for a successful MitM attack.
The author’s work and research resulted in a development of the wifimitm package
implemented in the Python language. This package serves as a software library which
provides functionality for automated MitM attack on WLANs. The implemented package
is therefore beneficial for others due to the fact that it can be easily incorporated into other
tools. The product of this research is also a tool which incorporates the functionality of the
wifimitm package. This tool named wifimitmcli manages the individual steps of automated
MitM attack and serves as a Command Line Interface. The implemented software comes
with a range of additions for a convenient usage, e.g., requirements installation scripts,
a requirements check, a Python package setup with wifimitmcli installation, README.md
file and a manual page.
The wifimitmcli tool, and therefore wifimitm as well, was tested during experiments with
an available set of equipment. As the results show, the implemented software product is
able to successfully perform an automated MitM attack on WLANs. More detailed testing,
in order to obtain a better proved conclusion, is going to be performed in a proper wireless
network laboratory.
A possible future progress of the project, which started by this thesis, is considered
especially in improving the success rate of the automated strategy. In the future iterations
of the development, the product could focus on exploiting the weaknesses of widely used
Wi-Fi Protected Setup. Concerning the current state of the product, it does not focus on
enterprise WLANs, which could be vulnerable as well. Further development should also
29
consider countermeasures of Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPSs).
At this point, the attack can be done automatically using the implemented CLI. De-
pending on a target group of users of the product, future development could also consider
implementation of various TUIs and GUIs. Implementation of various interfaces is possible
due to the fact that the product is implemented as a package providing all the required
functionality.
An advantage of automation of some process can be the fact, that the user has less work
to do and that deep understanding of the individual steps is not required for the usage. But
most importantly, the automated process is able to operate completely without a presence
of a human. The research product could be even used on a device of miniature dimensions,
as long as the device is able to satisfy the software and hardware requirements. This way,
an automated probe could be constructed. An operation would then consist of deploying
the probe device and its activation. The probe would then be able to perform an automated
attack and collect important data without any further human intervention.
This research and its products could find a good utilization in combination with other
security researches carried out at the Brno University of Technology, Faculty of Information
Technology. It can serve in an investigation done by forensic researchers (Pluskal et al.
2015). A software capable of automated MitM attack on WLANs can also be used to
improve the security of networks by automatically detecting their vulnerabilities. This way,
wifimitmcli can be considered an automated penetration testing tool.
Finally, popularization of the fact, that such severe attacks can be successfully auto-
mated, should be used to raise the public awareness about the information security. In these
days, this issue involves almost every one of us.
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Acronyms
AP Access Point.
ARP Address Resolution Protocol.
AUR Arch User Repository.
CLI Command Line Interface.
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check.
DAI Dynamic ARP Inspection.
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol.
DNS Domain Name System.
FSM Finite State Machine.
GPU Graphics Processing Unit.
GUI Graphical User Interface.
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol.
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure.
ICMPv6 Internet Control Message Protocol version 6.
IP Internet Protocol.
IPS Intrusion Prevention System.
IPv4 Internet Protocol version 4.
IPv6 Internet Protocol version 6.
IV Initialization Vector.
MAC Media Access Control.
MitM Man-in-the-Middle.
MITMf Framework for Man-In-The-Middle attacks.
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NA Neighbor Advertisement.
ND Neighbor Discovery.
NDI Neighbor Discovery Inspection.
NS Neighbor Solicitation.
OSA Open System Authentication.
PIN Personal Identification Number.
PMK Pairwise Master Key.
PRGA Pseudo Random Generation Algorithm.
PSK Pre-Shared Key.
RA Router Advertisement.
RC4 Rivest Cipher 4.
SKA Shared Key Authentication.
SSID Service Set Identifier.
STA Station.
stderr Standard error stream.
stdout Standard output stream.
TKIP Temporal Key Integrity Protocol.
TUI Text User Interface.
UID User Identifier.
WEP Wired Equivalent Privacy.
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network.
WPA Wi-Fi Protected Access.
WPA2 Wi-Fi Protected Access II.
WPS Wi-Fi Protected Setup.
XOR Exclusive Disjunction.
35
Appendices
36
List of Appendices
A DHCP sequence 38
B Phases of MitM attack on WLANs 39
C Structure of implemented tool 40
D Schema of experiments 41
E Summary of experiments 42
37
Appendix A
DHCP sequence
Server
(not selected) Client
Server
(selected)
Server
(not selected)
Client Server
(selected)
Begins initialization
DHCP Discover DHCP Discover
Determines configuration
Determines configuration
DHCP Offer
DHCP Offer
Collects replies
Selects configuration
DHCP Request DHCP Request
Commits configuration
DHCP Ack
Initialization complete
Graceful shutdown
DHCP Release
Discards lease
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Appendix B
Phases of MitM attack on WLANs
Accessing wireless network
scan
connect
crack impersonate (phishing)
Man-in-the-Middle attack
Tampering network topology stop
Capturing traffic stop
stop
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Appendix C
Structure of implemented tool
Entry points
wifimitm
resources
wifimitmcli
access
capture commonimpersonation
requirements
modeltopologyupdatableProcess
wep wpa2
dictionary
Attack data
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Appendix D
Schema of experiments
STA wifimitm
Internet
AP
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Appendix E
Summary of experiments
Results of experiments (table E.1) show, that open networks can be very easily attacked.
WEP OSA and WEP SKA secured networks can be successfully attacked even if they use
strong password. WPA PSK and WPA2 PSK secured networks suffer from weak passwords,
default passwords and mistakes of users.
Table E.1: Summary of wifimitmcli’s automated attacks.
Security PSK SSID AP STA Result
open test-open
TP-LINK,
TL-WR841N,
3.16.9 Build 150310
Rel.55295n
HTC
Desire 500,
Android 4.1.2
Success
open test-open
TP-LINK,
TL-WR841N,
3.16.9 Build 150310
Rel.55295n
Lenovo
IdeaPad Yoga 2,
Arch Linux 4.4.1
Success
WEP
OSA A_b#1 test-wep-osa
TP-LINK,
TL-WR841N,
3.16.9 Build 150310
Rel.55295n
HTC
Desire 500,
Android 4.1.2
Success
WEP
OSA A_b#1 test-wep-osa
TP-LINK,
TL-WR841N,
3.16.9 Build 150310
Rel.55295n
Meizu
m2 note,
Android 5.1
Success
WEP
OSA A_b#1 test-wep-osa
TP-LINK,
TL-WR841N,
3.16.9 Build 150310
Rel.55295n
Lenovo
IdeaPad Yoga 2,
Arch Linux 4.4.1
Success
WEP
SKA A_b#1 test-wep-ska
TP-LINK,
TL-WR841N,
3.16.9 Build 150310
Rel.55295n
HTC
Desire 500,
Android 4.1.2
Success
Continued on next page.
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Table E.1 (continued)
Security PSK SSID AP STA Result
WEP
SKA A_b#1 test-wep-ska
TP-LINK,
TL-WR841N,
3.16.9 Build 150310
Rel.55295n
Meizu
m2 note,
Android 5.1
Success
WEP
SKA A_b#1 test-wep-ska
TP-LINK,
TL-WR841N,
3.16.9 Build 150310
Rel.55295n
Lenovo
IdeaPad Yoga 2,
Arch Linux 4.4.1
Success
WPA
PSK 12345678 test-wpa-psk
TP-LINK,
TL-WR841N,
3.16.9 Build 150310
Rel.55295n
HTC
Desire 500,
Android 4.1.2
Success
WPA
PSK 12345678 test-wpa-psk
TP-LINK,
TL-WR841N,
3.16.9 Build 150310
Rel.55295n
Meizu
m2 note,
Android 5.1
Success
WPA
PSK 12345678 test-wpa-psk
TP-LINK,
TL-WR841N,
3.16.9 Build 150310
Rel.55295n
Lenovo
IdeaPad Yoga 2,
Arch Linux 4.4.1
Success
WPA2
PSK 12345678 test-wpa2-psk
TP-LINK,
TL-WR841N,
3.16.9 Build 150310
Rel.55295n
HTC
Desire 500,
Android 4.1.2
Success
WPA2
PSK 12345678 test-wpa2-psk
TP-LINK,
TL-WR841N,
3.16.9 Build 150310
Rel.55295n
Meizu
m2 note,
Android 5.1
Success
WPA2
PSK 12345678 test-wpa2-psk
TP-LINK,
TL-WR841N,
3.16.9 Build 150310
Rel.55295n
Lenovo
IdeaPad Yoga 2,
Arch Linux 4.4.1
Success
WPA2
PSK CWGUJAJX UPC1234567
TP-LINK,
TL-WR841N,
3.16.9 Build 150310
Rel.55295n
HTC
Desire 500,
Android 4.1.2
Success
WPA2
PSK CWGUJAJX UPC1234567
TP-LINK,
TL-WR841N,
3.16.9 Build 150310
Rel.55295n
Lenovo
IdeaPad Yoga 2,
Arch Linux 4.4.1
Success
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